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WHAT’S ALL THE NOISE ABOUT: DID THE NEW YORK
YANKEES VIOLATE FANS’ FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS BY
BANNING VUVUZELAS IN YANKEE STADIUM?
SHANE KOTLARSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
When Anthony Zachariadis attended a New York Yankees
game at Yankee Stadium on June 17, 2010, all he wanted to do was
to cheer on his hometown Yankees, and maybe heckle the visiting
Philadelphia Phillies and their fans a little bit too.1  Zachariadis
brought a vuvuzela with him to the stadium, and, after he allegedly
used it a few times to celebrate Yankees plays and to jeer at the
Phillies and their fans, Yankees security gave Zachariadis a choice:
either stop blowing the vuvuzela or leave.2  Zachariadis opted to
leave Yankee Stadium.3  The Yankees have since banned the horns
from the stadium.4
A vuvuzela is a plastic air horn that was first introduced to the
world on a large scale during the 2010 World Cup in South Africa.5
While the horns had been popular with soccer fans in Africa and
South and Central America for some time, their prevalence during
the 2010 World Cup was a rude introduction for many.6  The horn,
capable of reaching 127 decibels, became the unofficial soundtrack
of the World Cup.7  Its noise was heard unceasingly during
* Thank you to my family and to Brooke Childers for all their love and sup-
port.  Special thanks to Professor Gabe Feldman for his guidance throughout the
duration of this project.  B.A. Rice University, Houston, Texas; J.D. Tulane Univer-
sity Law School, New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. See Jeremy Olshan, Yanks Ban Vuvuzela Pests’ Instrument of Torture, N.Y. POST,
June 17, 2010, at 3, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/
bronx_blowhards_v3yRWOSPKLLHaIUNFaus1I (describing why Zachariadis
brought vuvuzela to Yankee Stadium).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See David Weiner, Vuvuzelas Banned From Yankee Stadium, HUFFINGTON POST
(June 17, 2010, 3:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/17/vuvuze-
las-banned-from-yan_n_616282.html (describing policy banning vuvuzelas from
Yankee Stadium).
5. See World Cup 2010: Organisers Will Not Ban Vuvuzelas, BBC (June 14, 2010,
1:23 PM) http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/world_cup_2010/8737455.
stm (describing prevalence of vuvuzelas at 2010 World Cup).
6. See id.
7. See id.  By comparison, a drum can reach 122 decibels, and a whistle can
reach 121.8 decibels. See id. Both a jet engine and a gunshot are 140 decibels, and
(35)
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matches, even blocking out the sound of the television commenta-
tors at times.8  The constant stream of vuvuzela noise from fans has
been compared to “the drone of a thousand bees or a herd of stam-
peding elephants.”9  While many fans and players called for the
vuvuzelas’ removal from the World Cup, the organizers decided
against it, wanting to maintain the authenticity of the event.10
Since the end of the World Cup, vuvuzelas have made their way to
other continents, earning bans at Wimbledon and at the stadiums
of several English Premier League teams.11  The Yankees were sim-
ply the next in line to ban the horns.12
While Zachariadis has not filed suit against the Yankees, one
has to wonder whether the Yankees may have violated his and fel-
low Yankees fans’ First Amendment rights by banning vuvuzelas
from Yankee Stadium.  The scope of this Article may be limited to
examining a narrow example of a restraint on a fan’s First Amend-
ment rights, but the problem of fans’ speech being restricted in
private stadiums is not confined to just one type of speech or one
team.13  This Article seeks to bring to light the prevalence of and
hearing loss begins at 180 decibels. See Decibel (Loudness) Comparison Chart, GALEN
CAROL AUDIO, http://www.gcaudio.com/resources/howtos/loudness.html (last
visited Jan. 29, 2012) (listing volume levels of different sounds).  While the differ-
ence between 127 and 122 decibels may not seem like much, a sound that is ten
decibels more is ten times louder, so a vuvuzela is five times louder than a drum or
whistle. See What is a Decibel, and How is it Measured?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://
www.howstuffworks.com/question124.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2012) (defining
decibel and providing examples of decibel levels for common noises); see also World
Cup 2010, supra note 5. R
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. (“[A] World Cup spokesman insisted vuvuzelas are ‘ingrained in
the history of South Africa’ and will remain.”).
11. See Weiner, supra note 4; see also Horn Scorn: Teams Ban Vuvuzelas, ESPN R
(July 20, 2010, 2:14 PM) http://espn.go.com/sports/soccer/news/_/id/5394238/
tottenham-hotspur-other-teams-ban-vuvuzelas-stadiums (noting that English Pre-
mier League clubs have also banned vuvuzelas).
12. See Weiner, supra note 4. R
13. See, e.g., Michael David Smith, Fan Sues Over NFL Conduct Policy, Says He
Has a Right To Swear, NBCSPORTS (Feb. 3, 2012, 3:38 PM), http://profootballtalk.
nbcsports.com/2012/02/03/fan-sues-over-nfl-stadium-conduct-policy-says-he-has-a-
right-to-swear/ (describing case of Arizona Cardinals fan who recently filed suit
against San Diego Chargers for being removed from stadium for “saying ‘F— you’
to two Chargers fans who challenged him to a fight”); Dan Steinberg, Redskins Ban
Signs at FedEx Field, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2009, 2:03 PM), http://voices.washington
post.com/dcsportsbog/2009/10/signs_banned_at_fedex_field.html (discussing
how Washington Redskins banned all signs and banners from FedEx Field, alleg-
edly for safety reasons, but also in effort to suppress negative speech about owner,
Dan Snyder); Mike Suggs, Octopus Trials: NHL Continues to Fight the Tradition in
Detroit, BLEACHER REPORT (Apr. 15, 2011), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/
667399-octopus-trials-nhl-continues-to-fight-the-tradition-in-detroit (detailing how
Detroit Red Wings fan was removed from arena and fined by Detroit Police for
2
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issues with prohibition on fan speech in private stadiums by exam-
ining the possible success of a claim, were Zachariadis to bring one.
Part II looks at whether vuvuzela noise should be protected by
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as cheering speech
or as expressive conduct.  Because a vuvuzela is obviously not
speech as it is typically defined, Part II addresses courts’ protection
of conduct and of non-verbal or non-written speech.
Part III focuses on the type of scrutiny with which a court
would analyze the Yankees’ decision to ban vuvuzelas from Yankee
Stadium.  Whether the court analyzes the speech-prohibiting rule
under strict or intermediate scrutiny depends on whether the re-
striction is viewed as a content-neutral restriction and whether the
Yankees have a substantial governmental interest in restricting
vuvuzelas at their stadium.
The public forum doctrine divides government-owned prop-
erty into three categories: traditional public fora, limited public
fora, and nonpublic fora.  Part IV of this Article examines the pub-
lic forum doctrine and the extent to which speech can be regulated
in each forum, and looks at how the situation in Yankee Stadium, as
a potential nonpublic forum, would be analyzed by a court.
Part V looks at what seems to represent the biggest roadblock
to a case of First Amendment speech in a professional sports arena:
the teams are not state or governmental actors.  As is the case with
all constitutional provisions, the First Amendment only protects
against laws made by Congress.14  However, private entities may still
be subject to these laws if they are deemed to be state actors via
either a symbiotic relationship or entwinement.  Part V will ex-
amine the possibility that the Yankees are state actors under both of
these theories.  This Article concludes by determining that vuvuze-
las are protected as speech under the First Amendment, and that
fans should have standing to bring a Constitutional claim against a
privately owned professional sports team because of the team’s rela-
tionship with the government.
II. SPEECH PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT: IS A VUVUZELA
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED SPEECH?
The first issue in any First Amendment case is determining
whether the speech or actions are of the type protected by the First
throwing octopus onto ice— long-standing tradition in Detroit—during Red
Wings’ playoff game).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (explaining right to free speech).
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Amendment.15  The First Amendment prohibits Congress from
making any law that “abridg[es] the freedom of speech.”16  How-
ever, the First Amendment does not provide protection for all
speech.17  In defining the limits of First Amendment protection,
the Supreme Court of the United States has held against laws that
protect obscenity, libelous or defamatory language, fighting words,
and incitement of imminent illegal action.18  Other than these de-
fined groups of speech not afforded protection, all speech is pre-
sumed to be deserving of protection under the First Amendment.19
The Court has also recognized in many decisions that First
Amendment-protected “speech” is not limited to just written or spo-
ken words.20  Conduct that expresses the same idea as the spoken
or written word may be deserving of the same Constitutional pro-
tection.21  Because vuvuzela noise is clearly not spoken or written
words, it could fall into two possible categories of constitutionally
protected actions: “cheering speech,” a term used to describe the
expressive speech of fans at sporting events;22 or conduct that is
protected as speech.23
15. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (determining whether flag
burning constitutes expressive conduct that is protected by First Amendment);
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment extends this prohibition, like other constitutional provisions, to states
and state actors. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (imposing limits on state ac-
tion); Christopher J. Kaufman, Unsportsmanlike Conduct: 15-Yard Penalty and Loss of
Free Speech in Public University Sports Stadiums, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1235, 1242 (2009)
(citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952)).
17. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1952) (noting classes of
speech that may be constitutionally prohibited).
18. See id. at 256-257 (“It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.”).
19. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
20. See id. at 404 (“The First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only
of ‘speech,’ but we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the
spoken or written word.”).
21. See id. at 420 (holding, inter alia, that burning of American flag is expres-
sive conduct); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (holding, inter alia,
that hanging flag upside down with peace sign sewn onto it is expressive conduct);
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969)
(“[R]ecogniz[ing] the expressive nature of students’ wearing of black armbands to
protest American military involvement in Vietnam.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that burning of draft card is expressive conduct).
22. See Howard M. Wasserman, Cheers, Profanity, and Free Speech, 31 J.C. & U.L.
377, 378 (2005) (describing expressive speech of sports fans as “cheering speech”).
23. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420; Spence, 418 U.S. at 406; Tinker, 393 U.S. at
505.
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A. Cheering Speech
“Cheering speech” is a term used by scholars to categorize the
“expression by fans related to a sporting event, to all aspects of the
game, all the participants in the game, and all the circumstances
surrounding the game.”24  It is not limited to oral statements made
by fans, but also includes written and symbolic messages and even
“throaty booing.”25  The Supreme Court has proclaimed the impor-
tance of allowing citizens to express their views on what they con-
sider important political and social issues in several cases.26
Scholars argue that cheering speech should undoubtedly be consti-
tutionally protected because it provides a platform for political and
social commentary.27
The link between sports and political commentary may not be
as readily apparent as the burning of an American flag was in Texas
v. Johnson,28 but many important issues still arise in the context of
sports.29  Arenas and stadiums provide an opportunity for expres-
sion on these issues by both fans and athletes.30  For example, when
then-President George W. Bush threw out the first pitch of the 2001
World Series, only a few weeks after the tragedies of September 11,
it was seen as a symbol of the strength of the United States.31  The
indelible image of Tommie Smith and John Carlos standing on the
podium of the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City, heads
bowed and black-glove-enclosed fists raised in the universal sign for
Black Power similarly addressed important issues in the sports con-
24. See Wasserman, Cheers, supra note 22, at 378. R
25. See Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of
Sports, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 525, 528-29 (2006) (including written and symbolic
messages in definition of “cheering speech”); see also Clay Calvert & Robert D.
Richards, Fans and the First Amendment: Cheering and Jeering in College Sports, 4 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16 (2004) (including booing in definition of “cheering
speech”).
26. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964) (recognizing “profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).
27. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 528-29. R
28. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
29. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 528-29. R
30. See id.
31. See Hal Bodley, President’s First Pitch Provided Healing Image: Bush’s Strike
Reaffirmed Influence of Baseball in Troubled Times, MLB.COM (Sept. 6, 2011, 10:00
AM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20110906&content_id=242958
06&vkey=09112011 (explaining symbolic significance of President Bush’s first
pitch at 2001 World Series).
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text.32  The pervasiveness of sports in our society gives further
weight to the idea that cheering speech should be protected as ex-
pressive First Amendment speech, regardless of connection to polit-
ical or social issues, just as it is in the areas of entertainment and
performance.33
B. Expressive Conduct
As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has held that in
some instances conduct may be deserving of the same constitu-
tional protection as written or oral speech.34  The test for deciding
when expressive conduct is protected as First Amendment speech
was first set out in Spence v. Washington.35  The Court then solidified
the application and meaning of this test in its decision in Texas v.
Johnson.36  Because not all conduct meant by the actor to convey a
message is protected as expressive conduct, the test set out by the
Court looks at whether the actor intended to “convey a particular-
ized message,” and whether the message is likely to be understood
by the audience.37
The party’s intent can be inferred from the context of the situ-
ation and the conduct of the actor.38  For example, in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District, the Court found it ap-
propriate to take into consideration the context of the situation
when determining whether the action of students wearing black
armbands was sufficiently demonstrative of the message they in-
tended to convey.39  According to the Court, it was necessary to
keep in mind that the “protest” occurred in the middle of the Viet-
nam War in order to see wearing the armbands as evidence of the
students’ message.40
32. See Tommie’s Bio, TOMMIESMITH.COM, http://www.tommiesmith.com/
bio.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012) (explaining symbolism and significance of
Tommie Smith’s gesture at 1968 Olympics).
33. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 528-29. R
34. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); Spence v. Washing-
ton, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
35. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-11.
36. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
37. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (“We cannot accept the view that an appar-
ently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person en-
gaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”); see also Spence, 418
U.S. at 410-11.
38. See id.
39. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505.
40. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505).
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However, in the interest of protecting various types of possible
expressive conduct, the Court has made it a low burden to show
that one conveyed a “particularized message” through his or her
expressive conduct.41  In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bi-
sexual Group of Boston, the Court looked at other examples of ex-
pressive conduct in which the message was less-than-clear, but
nonetheless a sufficient message.42  This included “saluting a flag
(and refusing to do so), . . . displaying a red flag, and even
‘[m]arching, walking or parading’ in uniforms displaying the swas-
tika.”43  Similarly, the Court lamented that if conduct were limited
to those situations in which the message of the “speech” was obvi-
ous to its audience, the test “would never reach the questionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock . . . or Jabberwocky verse of
Lewis Carroll.”44  The impossibility that an audience is certain to
understand the exact message one is trying to convey necessitates
the Court’s test that the audience only be “likely” to understand the
message.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit found no particularized message in a middle school student’s
desire to express herself through her clothing.45  Unlike the stu-
dent in Tinker, there was no context to which the plaintiff’s clothing
choice in Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School District was a particular-
ized message that its audience could understand.46  The Sixth Cir-
cuit similarly failed to find a particularized message that the specific
audience would understand in the blowing of one’s car horn to
protest the inauguration of a mayor.47  Like Blau, the court in
Meaney v. Dever found that even in the context of protesting a
41. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995) (explaining that expressive conduct does not need “a narrow, suc-
cinctly articulable message” to receive constitutional protection).
42. See id.
43. Id. (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (sa-
luting or refusing to salute flag); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(displaying red flags); Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977) (internal citations omitted) (wearing uniform displaying swastika)).
44. Id.
45. See Blau v. Fort Thomas Public Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir.
2005) (“[T]he Blaus have not met their burden of showing that the First Amend-
ment protects Amanda’s conduct-which in this instance amounts to nothing more
than a generalized and vague desire to express her middle-school individuality.”).
46. See id.
47. See Meaney v. Dever, 326 F.3d 283, 286-88 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Blasting an air
horn is qualitatively different from more readily understood expressive conduct of
inherent First Amendment significance, such as picketing, boycotting, canvassing,
and distributing pamphlets.  It is not an expressive act a fortiori, and thus does not
implicate the First Amendment unless context establishes it as such.”).
7
Kotlarsky: What's All the Noise About: Did the New York Yankees Violate Fans
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2013
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 8 19-FEB-13 9:45
42 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 20: p. 35
mayor’s inauguration, the conduct was insufficient to show a partic-
ularized message.48
In addition to the scenarios mentioned in which courts found
the action taken to be expressive conduct, and those where it has
not, the Supreme Court has recognized expressive conduct in vari-
ous types of entertainment.49  The Court has found that there is a
“particularized message” and the likelihood that the audience will
understand that message – and therefore the need to afford consti-
tutional protection – in music generally, nude dancing, and even
“low-grade” entertainment.50  In the context of a sporting event,
and with the Court’s protection of other forms entertainment with
less-particularized messages, fans’ cheering and jeering is likely to
fall within Constitutionally protected speech.  After all, there are
only so many teams to cheer for at any given game.
Looking at the hypothetical case at issue in this Article, blow-
ing a vuvuzela could arguably fall into either category of non-
speech protected as speech by the First Amendment: cheering
speech or expressive conduct.  If booing or whistling can be consid-
ered cheering speech, then a vuvuzela must be similarly protected
under the Constitution, because it communicates the same message
in an almost identical manner.  Additionally, fans are often en-
couraged to simply make noise in support of their team; “make
some noise” and “get loud” are frequently seen flashing across the
jumbotron of any stadium in America.  If a team were to say that
one type of noise is permitted in the stadium while another that
also has the purpose of supporting the team is not, this would seem
to be contrary to the intention of the law.  Despite opponents’ argu-
ments that the vuvuzela noise is devoid of an expressive element –
that it is merely a deafening distraction in the arena – it must fall
48. See id. at 288.
49. For cases where the court found actions to constitute expressive conduct,
see Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 406 (1974); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). For further discussion
of these expressive conduct cases, see supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text. R
For cases where the Court found that actions did not amount to expressive con-
duct, see Blau, 401 F.3d at 389-90; Meaney, 326 F.3d at 287-88.  For further discus-
sion of these expressive conduct cases, see supra notes 34-48 and accompanying R
text.
50. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) (“Music,
as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amend-
ment.”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991) (holding that
nude dancing is expressive conduct within First Amendment); see also IOTA XI
Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386, 391 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding that fraternity’s “ugly woman contest” qualified as expressive
conduct under Johnson test).
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into the same category of “cheering speech” as booing and
whistling.
Alternatively, a vuvuzela could be seen as expressive conduct
under the Johnson test, which looks at whether the action conveys a
particularized message likely to be understood by its audience.
When looking at the context of the situation to analyze whether a
particularized message exists, most blowing of a vuvuzela is done in
response to an event on the field.  While this is likely true for
Zachariadis’ situation, many complained about the non-stop chorus
of vuvuzelas during World Cup matches.51  Despite this counter-ar-
gument, the hypothetical case at issue in this Article is not analo-
gous to Meaney, in which the Sixth Circuit held that the multitude
of reasons for blowing one’s car horn was not sufficient for a find-
ing that the audience understood the message.  In a sports arena,
there are a limited number of reasons to make noise and they are
all generally understood by the other spectators.  Therefore,
vuvuzela noise likely passes the first part of First Amendment scru-
tiny under either the cheering speech or the expressive conduct
tests.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY UNDER THE
CONTENT-DISTINCTION PRINCIPLE
After determining whether the action is likely to be constitu-
tionally protected as expressive speech or conduct, the next step in
First Amendment scrutiny is to look at the validity of the rule
prohibiting the speech.52  Because the First Amendment prohibits
Congress from making these types of rules, the rules are referred to
as governmental actions.53  In the situation hypothetically at issue
in this Article, if a vuvuzela is afforded protection under the First
Amendment, either as “cheering speech” or expressive conduct,
the next step is to look at whether the Yankees’ ban on vuvuzelas is
a violation of fans’ First Amendment rights.  Courts use the content-
distinction principle to determine whether the government has jus-
tified its restriction of a constitutional right.54  The content-distinc-
tion principle dictates that the court must analyze the complained-
of regulation under either strict or intermediate scrutiny, depend-
51. Compare Olshan, supra note 1, with World Cup 2010, supra note 5. R
52. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
53. See id.
54. See Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986) (“This
Court has long held that regulations enacted for the purpose of restraining speech
on the basis of its content presumptively violate the First Amendment.”).
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ing on whether the regulation restrains the speech based on its con-
tent.55  The content-distinction principle, therefore, divides speech
regulations into two categories: content-based and content-
neutral.56
Content-based restrictions focus on either the subject matter
or viewpoint of the speech.57  Because this is the most direct means
of restricting speech, it is the most at odds with the letter and intent
of the First Amendment.58  Therefore, the courts apply a strict scru-
tiny test to determine the constitutionality of a content-based re-
striction.59  Under a strict scrutiny test, the government has the
burden of showing that the regulation was necessary to serve a com-
pelling governmental interest.60  In other words, they must prove
that there were no less restrictive alternative means to achieving the
intended goal.61  If the government can show that there was a com-
pelling interest for restricting speech, the court must uphold the
constitutionality of the regulation.62  Because the restriction by the
Yankees on vuvuzelas is not based on the subject matter or view-
point of the person blowing the vuvuzela, this Article will focus on
the second type of restrictions: content-neutral.
A. Content-neutral Restrictions.
A content-neutral, or “time, place, or manner,” restriction at-
tempts to curtail speech by regulating when, where, or how a per-
son may engage in speech (oral, written, or expressive conduct)
rather than restricting the message of the speech.63  The Court has
further identified two subcategories of content-neutral restrictions:
direct and incidental.64  In general, direct regulations restrict activi-
ties that are directly related to expressive activity protected by the
First Amendment, such as leafleting or picketing.65
55. See KEITH WERHAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 72-74 (2004) (explaining effect of applying content-
distinction principle).
56. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-47.
57. See id. (citing Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).
58. See WERHAN, supra note 55, at 73. R
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 73-74.
62. See id. at 74.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672
(1992) (analyzing restriction that prohibited members of religious group from
handing out religious literature and soliciting donations in several New York area
10
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol20/iss1/2
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\20-1\VLS102.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-FEB-13 9:45
2013] WHAT’S ALL THE NOISE ABOUT 45
Incidental regulations, on the other hand, restrict activities
that are not normally associated with expressive activity but which
may curtail First Amendment speech.66  However, incidental regula-
tions only trigger First Amendment scrutiny if they operate similarly
to direct regulations.67  An incidental restriction can act like a di-
rect regulation when it is not aimed at the significant expressive
element associated with the restricted activity, but has the effect of
limiting that element.68  For example, in Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, demonstrators were prohibited from sleeping in
tents on the National Mall, because the United States Park Service
regulations permit sleeping only in designated camping areas,
which the National Mall was not.69  The Supreme Court held,
“[T]he prohibition on camping, and on sleeping specifically, is con-
tent-neutral and is not being applied because of disagreement with
the message presented.”70  While the demonstrators’ claim was ulti-
mately unsuccessful, Clark shows how a regulation prohibiting
camping in non-designated areas can have the incidental effect of
limiting speech and consequently how an incidental regulation can
act to directly affect someone’s First Amendment-protected speech
or conduct.71
Another example of a situation in which an incidental restric-
tion acts as a direct restriction, is when the regulation has the “inev-
itable effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity.”72
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
nue, the Court held that by imposing a significant tax on the
purchase of large quantities of ink and newspaper, the restriction
put in place by the Minnesota government had the incidental effect
of restricting newspaper companies’ ability to purchase supplies,
airports); see also Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (analyzing law
prohibiting picketing within 150 feet of school buildings).
66. See WERHAN, supra note 55, at 74-75. R
67. See id. at 75. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (ruling that tax on paper and ink violated First
Amendment by imposing significant burden on freedom of press).
68. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984)
(“[R]easonable time, place, or manner regulations normally have the purpose and
direct effect of limiting expression but are nevertheless valid.”).
69. See id. at 290-91.  The demonstrators were planning to sleep in tents on
the National Mall as part of their protest to bring light to the plight of the home-
less in our country. See id.
70. Id. at 295.
71. Id. at 292.
72. WERHAN, supra note 55, at 74-75; see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., R
460 U.S. at 591-93.
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and therefore, restricted their “freedom of the press.”73  Both Clark
and Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. provide excellent examples of
ways in which a rule or law that is not intended to restrict one’s First
Amendment rights can act in a way that prevents exercise of Consti-
tutional guarantees.
Unlike content-based restrictions which – deservedly so – are
reviewed under a standard of strict scrutiny, content-neutral restric-
tions are subject to intermediate scrutiny.74  This applies to both
direct and incidental regulations, but as mentioned above, only in
situations that an incidental regulation acts as a direct regulation.75
Because content-neutral regulations do not directly limit the con-
tent of the speech, as do direct regulations, the Supreme Court de-
termined that the strict scrutiny standard was unduly burdensome
to the governmental entities making the rules.76  Instead, the regu-
lations are subject to intermediate scrutiny, which asks whether the
regulation furthers “an important or substantial governmental in-
terest,” is narrowly tailored to advance that interest, and leaves
open ample alternative avenues of communication.77
B. Substantial Governmental Interests: Fan Safety and
Noise Restrictions
The difference between requiring the government to prove the
existence of a “compelling” interest versus a “substantial” interest is
significant in the effect on the government’s ability to prove the
permissibility of its challenged regulation.  Not only does the lower
burden placed on governments under the intermediate scrutiny
standard allow more opportunity to show the necessity for the re-
striction on peoples’ speech, but it also allows the government to
show that it did not intend to limit First Amendment speech or
73. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S. at 592-93.
74. WERHAN, supra note 55, at 74-75. R
75. Id.
76. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
77. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.  The Supreme Court defines intermediate
scrutiny in O’Brien:
To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must ap-
pear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling;
substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.  Whatever impre-
cision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regula-
tion is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental in-
terest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id.; see also WERHAN, supra note 55, at 75 (quoting O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377). R
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conduct and that the rule should not be deemed unconstitutional
based on unintended consequences.78
For example, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims
Board, the Supreme Court found that providing victims of crimes
with monetary compensation was an example of a compelling inter-
est that justified New York’s content-based “Son of Sam” laws.79
Under the “Son of Sam” laws, if an entity entered into a contract
with a person “accused or convicted of a crime” for a book or other
work describing the crime of which they were convicted or accused,
whatever money was due to the convicted or accused person must
instead be paid to the Crime Victims Board.80  The Crime Victims
Board held the money in an escrow account “for the benefit of and
payable to any victim.”81  The Supreme Court found that this was a
content-based restriction because it imposed a financial burden on
a party based on the content of their speech.82  Therefore the gov-
ernment restriction was analyzed under strict scrutiny, and it was
New York’s burden to prove that this remuneration for victims of
crimes was a “compelling” governmental interest in justification of
restricting authors’ and publishers’ First Amendment rights.83
While the Court ultimately held that the law was not sufficiently
narrowly drawn to meet the purpose of compensation for victims, it
also held that, “[t]here can be little doubt . . . that the State has a
compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compen-
sated by those who harm them . . . . The State likewise has an undis-
puted interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from their
crimes.”84  While this quote may not seem illustrative or useful in
defining a “compelling interest,” the fact is that the Court goes no
further in defining a compelling interest than to say, “[t]here can
be little doubt.”  Perhaps the Court merely applies in this situation
what Justice Stewart famously said about obscenity in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, “I know it when I see it.”85
The Supreme Court tends to rely on its own precedent in cre-
ating a scale between “compelling” and “substantial” governmental
interests rather than creating a bright-line rule to define the
78. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
79. 502 U.S. 105, 118-119 (1991) (recognizing state’s interest in compensat-
ing crime victims).
80. Id. at 108-09.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 115.
83. See id. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 118-19.
85. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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terms.86  The Court has even used the terms interchangeably in the
same opinion.87  However, the case law provides examples of gov-
ernmental interests that would most likely not stand up to a strict
scrutiny analysis, but which the court has found to be substantial
under intermediate scrutiny.88  In the context of limiting the rights
of sports fans, there are some governmental interests that courts
have found to be more convincing than others, but still not suffi-
ciently compelling to stand up under strict scrutiny analysis.89
These include protecting minors from vulgar language,90 protect-
ing fans from obstructions and dangerous objects,91 and a desire to
control noise levels.92
In Barrett v. Khayat, a case was brought against the University of
Mississippi complaining that their policy banning, among other
things, flags larger than twelve by fourteen inches at football games
was a violation of fans’ constitutional right to wave a flag in support
of their Ole Miss Rebels.93  The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Mississippi held in favor of the University, rec-
ognizing the University of Mississippi’s argument that it had a legiti-
mate interest in creating a safe and enjoyable stadium atmosphere
for its fans by eliminating the potential hazard of flagsticks and the
obstruction of other fans’ view caused by the flags.94  While the
86. See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1259 (citing U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, R
177 (1983)).
87. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (“To character-
ize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has em-
ployed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong.”).
88. See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1259-67; see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Ra- R
cism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (recogniz-
ing governmental interest in protecting children from exposure to indecent
language); Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A. 397CV211BA, 1999 WL 33537194 (N.D.
Miss. Nov. 12, 1999) (recognizing governmental interest in “providing game man-
agement and control and a safe and pleasant environment for thousands of
people”).
89. See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1259. R
90. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 741.
91. See Barrett, 1999 WL 33537194, at *4.
92. See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796.
93. See Barrett, 1999 WL 33537194, at *1.
94. Id. at *4.  While “[t]he University officials have stated that because they
feared possible injuries caused by flag sticks and had received complaints from
spectators that flags obstructed their view,” it was well-known and widely under-
stood that a significant reason for the University’s decision was an effort to limit
the presence of Confederate battle flags at games and to limit the pervasive senti-
ment of racism that surrounded the University’s athletic program. See id.; Brian
Cabell, Flag Ban Tugs on Ole Miss Traditions: Confederate Banner Impedes Athletic
Recruiting, CNN (Oct. 25, 1997, 10:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9710/25/
ole.miss (“[The ban on wooden sticks is] ostensibly for safety reasons, but no one is
14
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court did not get into the issue of whether creating a safer environ-
ment and eliminating obstructions to the view was a compelling
governmental interest (because the restriction was not content-
based and there was therefore no need to delve into strict scrutiny
analysis), it is not likely that these “substantial” interests would sur-
vive strict scrutiny as “compelling” interests.
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, New York City attempted to reg-
ulate the volume of rock concerts in Central Park after numerous
complaints “about excessive sound amplification” from other park
users and residents in the areas around the park.95  In response to
the complaints, the City required concert promoters to use a sound
technician and amplification system provided by the City for all of
the performers.96  The Court held that the City had an “undenia-
ble” governmental interest in limiting the volume of the concerts;97
it “ha[s] a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwel-
come noise.”98
Looking at the other factors of the intermediate scrutiny test in
this case, the Court found that the restriction was narrowly tailored
to the governmental interest without unduly restraining the per-
formers’ First Amendment expression, because the City-provided
sound technician could control the volume of the concert while still
allowing the performer complete control over the sound mix.99
The Court found that neither the time nor the place of the con-
certs was restricted and therefore there were sufficient remaining
avenues of communication, fulfilling the third prong of the inter-
mediate scrutiny test.100  Additionally, while the volume restriction
may potentially limit the size of the audience capable of hearing the
music, it does not affect First Amendment issues, and therefore is
not taken into serious consideration during intermediate scrutiny
analysis.101
fooled – it is clearly an attempt to keep out the Confederate flags attached to those
sticks.”); see also JB Clark, Ole Miss Faces Loss of “From Dixie with Love” if Controversial
Chant Continues, DAILY MISSISSIPPIAN (Nov. 2, 2009, 3:08 AM), http://archive.
thedmonline.com/article/ole-miss-band-faces-loss-dixie-love-if-controversial-chant-
continues (discussing University Chancellor’s request to marching band to stop
playing school’s fight song, “From Dixie with Love,” because students were chant-
ing “the South will rise again” at end of song).
95. 491 U.S. at 784-85.
96. See id. at 787.
97. See id. at 800.
98. Id. at 796 (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 806 (1984)).
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C. Captive Audience Doctrine
In addition to protecting the safety of spectators, and provid-
ing them with unobstructed views and entertainment at a reasona-
ble volume, a governmental entity may have a substantial interest in
protecting people from unwilling and unavoidable exposure to “ob-
jectionable speech.”102  To decide the constitutionality of restric-
tions on unwanted speech in enclosed places, the Supreme Court
created a standard in Cohen v. California that would become known
as the captive audience doctrine.103  Under the captive audience
doctrine, governments may make laws that restrict otherwise Consti-
tutionally protected speech in certain places where the listener may
not leave or avoid the expression.  The doctrine is not universally
applicable, however:
[G]overnment may properly act in many situations to pro-
hibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwelcome
views and ideas . . . , [but] we have at the same time con-
sistently stressed that “we are often ‘captives’ outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech.”104
The Court has sought to protect invasions of unwanted speech into
the home, but to attempt to protect everybody from all unwanted
speech “would effectively empower a majority to silence dissidents
simply as a matter of personal predilections.”105  Therefore, the
Court held that where the unwilling recipient can avoid the mes-
sage by “averting their eyes,” or making the “short, though regular,
journey from mail box to trash can,” they are not a captive
audience.106
Additionally, the extent to which someone is deserving of pro-
tection from unwanted speech depends on where they are and
other parties’ First Amendment Rights in those places.  The Cohen
102. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (quoting Rowan v. U.S. Post
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970)).
103. See Gregory Matthew Jacobs, Curbing Their Enthusiasm: A Proposal to Regu-
late Offensive Speech at Public University Basketball Games, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 547, 555
(2006) (“[T]he Court emphasized that the portion of the statute upon which Co-
hen’s conviction rests evinces no concern . . . with the special plight of the captive
auditor.  Due to this explanation, the principle has since been labeled the captive
audience doctrine.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (quoting Rowan, 397 U.S. at 738).
105. See id.
106. See id.; Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (rea-
soning that recipients of mailed contraceptive advertisements were not captive au-
dience because the recipients could simply throw away the advertisements).
16
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Court creates a spectrum of privacy, with the home being the place
where people are most deserving of protection from unwanted
speech and others have the lowest right to express themselves, to a
public space, in which one has a stronger interest in his right to free
speech and less of an interest in avoidance of others’ expression.107
The unwilling party is required to take more action to avoid contact
with unwanted speech in places outside the home.108
Another consideration when applying the captive audience
doctrine is that there may be situations in which any contact with
certain types of speech cannot be avoided regardless of affirmative
action taken towards that goal.109  When this is the case, the govern-
ment will always have a substantial interest to justify a restriction on
speech.  For example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court held
that the effect of the vulgar language of George Carlin’s “Seven
Dirty Words” performance could not be negated by turning off the
radio.110  The Court reasoned that holding that a person could suc-
cessfully avoid the unwanted language by turning off the radio is
“like saying the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow.”111  The FCC’s restriction on Carlin’s act was upheld as consti-
tutional, because one’s car is not a place easily escaped and appar-
ently neither can one escape Carlin’s foul language once it has
been heard.112  This decision may seem strange considering the
Court’s opinion in Cohen, in which it held that people could avoid
the plaintiff’s obscenity by averting their eyes despite having seen
the curse-word once.113  While one could easily argue that the dif-
ference in the facts of each case created the disagreeing opinions, it
is moot; the Pacifica decision is still good law and any challenger to
a restriction on speech must consider the nature of speech and the
environ of its audience to decide if they may be a captive audience
incapable of escaping the message.
107. Cohen, 402 U.S. at 21-22.  The courthouse where the defendant in Cohen
wore his obscenity-laced jacket falls somewhere in between the home and “Central
Park.” Id.
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
110. See id.  Vulgar language must be distinguished from obscene language,
which is not protected under the First Amendment. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 255-56 (1952).
111. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
112. See id. at 749.
113. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
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D. The Yankees’ Situation Under the
Content-Distinction Principle
The Yankees’ ban of vuvuzelas is a content-neutral restriction,
which would trigger intermediate scrutiny.  That test looks at
whether the regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest,
is narrowly tailored to advance that interest, and leaves open ample
alternative avenues of communication.114  This Part of the Article
examines whether the Yankees had a substantial interest in restrict-
ing the use of vuvuzelas based on the case law of the content-dis-
tinction principle and captive audience doctrine.
Like the University of Mississippi in Barrett, the Yankees could
claim that there is in an interest in protecting their fans from po-
tential dangers or obstructions to their view.  It is unlikely that a
court would agree with the Yankees that vuvuzelas present a safety
problem or obstruct fans’ view.  Alternatively, and extending the
rationale supplied by the court in that case, the Yankees have a sub-
stantial interest in ensuring their fans enjoy their experience in the
stadium and constant vuvuzela noise is not exactly conducive to
that.  This is a losing argument in the hypothetical case.  Not only
was the court in Barrett searching for justification to meet the end
goal they sought – elimination of Ole Miss’s racist reputation – but
fan enjoyment does not seem to reach the level of a compelling
interest that the Supreme Court upheld in cases like Simon &
Schuster.
Use of vuvuzelas as noisemakers in the past may mean the most
substantial governmental interest would be in restricting the noise
in the stadium. Ward v. Rock Against Racism upheld a noise restric-
tion in the interest of other park users and people in the surround-
ing areas.115  While many people may live around Yankee Stadium,
it is not certain that the noise from the stadium filters out to the
surrounding streets, or that it would be any louder than a game
normally is or any louder than the normal noise of Bronx streets.
However, it may be in the interest of other fans in the stadium that
the Yankees enacted the policy, in an attempt to limit the potential
noise created by an instrument that can reach 127 decibels.116
Despite the strong argument presented by noise-reduction as a
substantial governmental interest, the Yankees likely would not be
able to overcome the fact that under the captive audience doctrine,
114. See WERHAN, supra note 55, at 75. R
115. 491 U.S. at 803.
116. See World Cup 2010, supra note 5. R
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fans are deserving of a lower degree of protection inside the sta-
dium.  While opponents of this restriction would argue that unwill-
ing listeners could avoid the vuvuzelas by not entering the stadium
in the first place or leaving if they do not like the noise,117 this is a
substantial burden being placed on the unwilling listener.118  Addi-
tionally, vuvuzela noise is not comparable to Carlin’s Seven Dirty
Words act in Pacifica Foundation that the Supreme Court held could
not be unlistened-to.
IV. PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
The next step of First Amendment scrutiny looks at “the public
forum doctrine,” which dictates that the extent to which govern-
ment actors may regulate speech depends on the type of forum in
which the speech is being regulated.119  The other part of the equa-
tion with regards to this doctrine is a person’s right to free speech
in each type of place, which depends in part on the intended pur-
pose of the forum.120  The three categories, identified by the Su-
preme Court in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
are traditional public fora, limited public fora, and nonpublic
fora.121  The Court in Perry did more than just name the types of
fora and the level of permissible government restriction; it also ana-
lyzed the level of scrutiny attached to restrictions on those fora.122
A. Traditional Public Fora
As the Supreme Court in Perry stated, traditional public fora
are those “which by long tradition or by government fiat have been
devoted to assembly and debate.”123  Examples of these typically
outdoor and wide-open areas include sidewalks, streets, and parks;
places where people tend to congregate for the purpose of expres-
sing themselves.124  Because traditional public fora were used for
117. See Cohen, 402 U.S. at 21.
118. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983).
119. See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1254. R
120. Id. See also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
44 (1983) (“The existence of a right of access to public property and the standard
by which limitations upon such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the
character of the property at issue.”).
121. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-48; Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1254-57. R
122. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
123. Id. at 45.
124. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1983) (“Sidewalks, of
course, are among those areas of public property that traditionally have been held
open to the public for expressive activities and are clearly within those areas of
public property that may be considered, generally without further inquiry, to be
19
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the purpose of public expression, government power to implement
restrictions on speech is limited in those areas.125  The general test
of the content-distinction principle is applied: content-based re-
strictions are examined under strict scrutiny; content-neutral under
intermediate scrutiny.126
While outdoor venues like parks and streets were assumed to
be traditional public fora by the Supreme Court in Perry and in
other decisions,127 the analysis should not be so summarily decided.
In United States v. Grace, the Court stated, “Publicly owned or oper-
ated property does not become a ‘public forum’ simply because
members of the public are permitted to come and go at will.”128  In
that case, a man brought suit to defend his right to hand out leaf-
lets on the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building after
being removed pursuant to a statute prohibiting leaflet activity on
Supreme Court property including the sidewalk.129  One of the is-
sues was whether the government made the sidewalk a space availa-
ble for people to use for “communicative purposes,” not simply
whether it had traditionally been used for assembly and public ex-
pression.130  While the traditional use of the space is certainly part
of the consideration for courts, public spaces are not open to free
expression in all situations regardless of government interest.131
public forum property.”); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Hague v. Comm. Indus.
Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939):
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions.  Such use of the streets and pub-
lic places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immuni-
ties, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id.
125. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
126. See supra Part III (explaining circumstances in which government may
use content-based restrictions).  Strict scrutiny requires the government show the
regulation was necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest. See WERHAN,
supra note 55, at 73.  “[The government actor] must show . . . that it is narrowly R
drawn to achieve that end.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 461 (1980)); see supra Part III(a) (explaining circumstances in which govern-
ment may use content-neutral restrictions); see also Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (stating
that regulation can pass intermediate scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to serve
substantial or significant government interest and “leave[s] open ample alternative
channels of communication”).
127. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
128. 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
129. Id. at 172-73 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 6135 (2006)) (formerly 40 U.S.C.
§ 13(k)).
130. Id. at 177.
131. Id. at 177-78. (“We have regularly rejected the assertion that people who
wish ‘to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so when-
20
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The government actor has the ability to control access to the public
property – having park hours, for example – and must be able to
ban people from the premises who do not have any legitimate pur-
pose in being there.132  Therefore, the Court held that the govern-
ment was permitted to regulate access to an area normally thought
of as a traditional public forum, and that – before reaching consid-
eration of the governmental interest – it could restrict pamphleting
in front of the Supreme Court in Grace.133
B. Limited Public Fora
Limited public fora are those that the government has opened
to the public to use as places of expressive speech, but that are not
traditionally used for public expression.134  While a limited public
forum does not need to “indefinitely retain the open character,” to
the extent that it does, government restrictions upon it are analyzed
as if it was a traditional public forum.135  For example, the Univer-
sity of Missouri at Kansas City made University space (which is pub-
lic space because the University is a public institution) available for
student groups to meet in Widmar v. Vincent.136  However, the Uni-
versity refused to allow a religious student group to meet in Univer-
sity rooms.137  The Supreme Court held that where the University
(or other public or governmental entity) is not required to open a
forum for public expression, but chooses to do so, exclusions from
that area or restrictions within that area “bear a heavy burden of
justification.”138
ever and however and wherever they please.’” (quoting Adderly v. Florida, 385
U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966))).
132. Id. at 178.
133. Id.
134. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
135. See id.; see also Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that school open for use on weekends and after-school
hours by non-school groups is limited public forum and that all restrictions on
public use during non-school hours are subject to same scrutiny as if facility were
traditional public forum); see also S.E. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975) (holding that city municipal theater can be limited public forum if held out
as place for public expression at times).
136. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981) (describing university’s
policy on student group meetings on university property).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 267-68 (citing City of Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. #8 v. Wis. Em-
ployment Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976)).
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C. Nonpublic Fora
The last category of government-owned spaces under the pub-
lic forum doctrine is nonpublic fora.  A nonpublic forum is govern-
ment property maintained for its intended use rather than public
property that has traditionally been held out as a place for public
communication (like traditional public fora) and which has not
been made available to the public for this purpose (limited public
fora).139  Examples include government offices and airports.140
“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee access to property
simply because it is owned or controlled by the government.”141
Whether a place is a nonpublic or other forum depends on the
“normal and intended function” of the space.142  A public high
school, and different parts of the school, can be both a limited pub-
lic forum and a nonpublic forum depending on how it is used.143
However, the Court has given governments leeway in these fora by
only requiring that a regulation on speech be reasonable and not
with the intent of eliminating contrary speech.144
Determining in which category of the public forum doctrine
sports stadiums fall, and specifically Yankee Stadium, is essential to
proper analysis of restrictions on expression therein.  It is almost
certain that sports arenas are not traditional public fora.  Yankee
Stadium is not part of a public university, and its sole purpose is for
the presentation of baseball games and the enjoyment of fans, so it
is not likely to be considered a nonpublic forum.
Yankee Stadium, therefore, would likely be considered a lim-
ited public forum.  It is open to the paying public only for baseball
games and other events, not at all times like parks or sidewalks,
which are quintessential traditional public fora.  Much like a
school, Yankee Stadium is also designated as a public forum for ex-
pression during those times, and closed for these purposes the rest
139. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; see also Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1256-57. R
140. See Kaufman, supra note 16, at 1256 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Con- R
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992)).
141. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburg
Civic Ass’n, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (quotations omitted)).
142. See id. at 46-47.
143. Compare Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47 (holding that school mailroom is non-
public forum because its intended purpose is to facilitate internal school mail, not
as place for public expression on which teachers’ union is preferred), with Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (holding that
school open for use during weekends and after-school hours by non-school groups
is limited public forum).
144. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
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of the time.145  If the stadium is a limited public forum, regulations
on speech during the times it is open for expression are subject to
the same First Amendment scrutiny as in traditional public fora.146
V. THE STATE ACTOR PROBLEM
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from placing restric-
tions on free speech.147  States are bound by the Constitution and
its Amendments by way of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.148  The Supreme Court has held that the Four-
teenth Amendment also applies to state and local governments,
school districts, public universities, and many other entities.149  Sub-
sequently, private actors are generally not bound by the Constitu-
tional limitations of the First Amendment.150  This would seem to
present a problem with Zachariadis’ hypothetical situation at issue
in this Article because the Yankees are clearly not a state or local
government, and do not seem to fit into any of the other categories
of public entities mentioned.  Unlike public universities, such as the
University of Mississippi in Barrett, which are subject to Constitu-
tional scrutiny because they are considered subsets of the state gov-
ernment, all but one professional sports team are privately-owned
and -operated, and therefore seemingly immune.151  However,
sports teams have been held to be state actors in the past based on
the financial relationship the team has with the City.152  It is possi-
145. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384.
146. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
147. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. Congress includes all members of the federal
government, not just members of the Legislature; see also Barron ex rel Tiernon v.
Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. 243 (1833) (holding Fifth Amendment to be applicable to
all members of federal government).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
149. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland Cty., Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968) (“The ac-
tions of local government are the actions of the State.”); Carlson v. California, 310
U.S. 106 (1943) (striking down local ordinance as violative of Fourteenth Amend-
ment); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); Duke v. N.
Tex. State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 837 (5th Cir. 1972) (analyzing termination of state
university faculty member under Fourteenth Amendment); Horvath v. Westport
Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to
public library); Chi. Area Military Project v. City of Chi., 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.
1975) (applying Fourteenth Amendment to government-owned airport).
150. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 538; see, e.g., Gilmore v. City of R
Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 565 (1974) (stating that Fourteenth Amendment does
not apply to private actions).
151. See Shareholders, PACKERS.COM, http://www.packers.com/community/
shareholders.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2012) (noting that Green Bay Packers, Inc.
“has been a publicly owned, nonprofit corporation since Aug. 18, 1923.”).
152. See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that
Yankees are public actor because Yankee Stadium was leased to team by New York
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ble that the current complicated financial relationships between
professional sports franchises and the cities in which they play –
intended to remove the team from the situation that led to the
Yankees’ state actor determination in Ludtke v. Kuhn – could place
them within the realm of state actor.
There are certain situations in which a private entity can be
held to be a state actor.153  This is generally referred to as the pub-
lic-private relationship.154  The two seminal cases in which private
entities were found to be state actors offer two differing theories on
how the public-private relationship occurs: symbiotic relationship
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, and the entwinement the-
ory in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n.155
The difference between the two theories is slight, and courts and
scholars often have difficulty distinguishing between the suggested
tests in the cases.156  A brief look at the Supreme Court’s decision
in the Burton and Brentwood Academy cases can help distinguish be-
tween the two theories, and demonstrate ways in which the Yankees
and other sports franchises could be considered state actors.
A. Symbiotic Relationship
The symbiotic relationship test emerges from Burton and looks
to see whether the private party and State actor have conferred ben-
efits upon each other within the scope of their relationship such
City and because stadium is “maintained and improved with the use of public
funds”).
153. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 538 (citing Brentwood Acad. v. R
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding that exclusion of African
American from privately-owned restaurant violated Fourteenth Amendment due to
restaurant’s entwinement with government).
154. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 718.
155. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 538.  There are two other tests that R
can be used to find a private entity to be a state actor that will not be examined by
this Article because they do not apply to the instant hypothetical situation: the
joint activity test and traditional powers test. See Sw. Cmty. Res., Inc. v. Simon
Prop. Group, LP, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1252 (D.N.M. 2000) (listing state actor
tests).  Private persons jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action
are acting as state actors. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (applying
joint activity test).  Courts may also find state action “in the exercise by a private
entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.”  Jackson v. Metro
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (applying traditional powers test).
156. See Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (misapplying
entwinement theory). The Ludtke court looked at the entwinement aspect of the
public-private relationship in Burton, which actually espoused the symbiotic rela-
tionship theory. See id.  The Ludtke court took the phrase “so entwined” out of the
context of Burton and inappropriately applied it. See id.; see also Wasserman, Fans,
supra note 25, at 538 (discussing confusion among other scholars on the issue of R
public-private relationships).
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that they become “joint participant[s] in the challenged activ-
ity . . . .”157  In Burton, the Supreme Court found that when the
lease agreement between a private entity (a restaurant) and the
State (which owned the parking garage in which the restaurant was
located) provided for significant funding from the State, it created
a position of interdependence between the parties.158  When there
is an interdependent relationship manifesting from State responsi-
bility and a reward for the private party as a result of that relation-
ship, any action must be seen as state action even when taken by the
private entity.159  Therefore, the restaurant’s refusal to serve an Af-
rican American customer was held to be state action.160
After the Burton decision, however, the Supreme Court began
to narrow situations in which a private actor can be held to be a
state actor based on its public-private symbiotic relationship.161
“Where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must
have ‘significantly involved itself with invidious discrimination’ in
order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition.”162  The Court was seeking to dispel the
common understanding of Burton that renting from the govern-
ment was equivalent to being a state actor.
In Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit took this advice beyond
what was necessary while examining and applying the Supreme
157. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725; Moose Lodge No. 17 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972) (referring to test applied in Burton as “symbiotic relationship” test); Nick
DeSiato, Silencing the Crowd: Regulating Free Speech in Professional Sports Facilities, 20
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 411, 418 n.40 (2010) (explaining that Moose Lodge court
coined new name for test applied in Burton).
158. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 717.  “The costs of land acquisition, construction,
and maintenance are defrayed entirely from donations by the City of Wilmington,
from loans and revenue bonds and from the proceeds of rentals and parking ser-
vices out of which the loans and bonds were payable.” Id. at 723.  The Court also
mentioned the tax benefits for the restaurant and the convenient parking for its
customers. See id.
159. See id. at 716.
160. See id. at 725-26.
161. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442 (10th
Cir. 1995) (noting that Court has tended to read Burton narrowly).  Subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have read Burton narrowly:
The present Supreme Court . . . has not found state action in any case
that has relied upon Burton.  In each case in which the applicability of
Burton has arisen, the Court has distinguished Burton on its facts as part of
its justification for not finding state action.
Id. at 1451 (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGA-
TION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES, §§ 5.10 to 5.15 (2d ed. 1991)).
162. Moose Lodge No. 17, 407 U.S. at 173 (finding no state action on part of
private club enjoying benefits of state liquor license) (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967)).
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Court’s decision in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Committee.163 The court held that evidence of receipt of state funds
is not enough to create a public-private symbiotic relationship, plac-
ing further distance from the Supreme Court’s decision in Bur-
ton.164  This simplifies and misconstrues the Court’s decision in San
Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. and should not be used to diminish
the impact of Burton on subsequent cases and, more importantly for
this Article, on Zacharaidis’ hypothetical situation.  In San Francisco
Arts & Athletics, Inc., the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) did not
receive funding, but instead Congress sought to assist the USOC
with its applications for grants.165  Furthermore, funding was not
the deciding factor in the Court’s decision that the USOC is not a
government actor.166
The fact that Congress granted it a corporate charter does
not render the USOC a Government agent.  All corpora-
tions act under charters granted by a government, usually
by a State. They do not thereby lose their essentially pri-
vate character. Even extensive regulation by the govern-
ment does not transform the actions of the regulated
entity into those of the government.167
Despite the Tenth Circuit’s holding otherwise in Gallagher, the
Burton decision does not explicitly stand for the notion that the act
of receiving money from the government transforms the private ac-
tor into a government entity.  Receiving a benefit from the govern-
ment does not automatically create a symbiotic relationship
between the State and private entity.168  There are too many gov-
ernment services that companies receive for this to be the case.169
Instead, Burton is more appropriately read – and the Burton symbi-
otic relationship test more appropriately understood – to look at
the benefit received by each side as a facts-and-circumstances analy-
163. 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (holding USOC to be private actor for Fifth Amend-
ment purposes).
164. See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1451.




168. See Moose Lodge No. 17, 407 U.S. at 173 (“The Court has never held, of
course, that discrimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the
Equal Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service
at all from the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever.”).
169. See id.
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sis of whether the private company should be held to be a state
actor.
B. Alternative Types of Stadium Financing: Which Did the
Yankees Use and Which Give Rise to Constitutional Scrutiny?
The most noteworthy case of a professional sports franchise
subject to constitutional scrutiny by way of a symbiotic relationship
is Ludtke.170  In Ludtke, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that the Yankees were a public
actor in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for banning wo-
men from their locker room immediately following games.171  The
court reasoned that the stadium was leased to the team by New York
City, it was “maintained and improved with the use of public funds,”
and the Yankees were able to thrive in the stadium.172  The court
held that under the Burton standard, there was a symbiotic relation-
ship between public and private actors.173
The Ludtke case is a clear example of an interdependent rela-
tionship in which the private actor receives a financial benefit from
the city.  In exchange, the city reaped the benefits of having a sports
franchise, which include a boost to the local economy, revitalization
of urban areas, and “an intangible benefit—the psychic, symbolic,
and cultural benefit to the community of being a ‘major league city’
and the civic pride and unity created[.]”174  In the past, teams often
received favorable long-term leases from the state or city either for
the stadium, which was built and paid for by the city, for the land to
build a stadium, or both.175  However, since the decision in Ludtke,
teams are wary of being held as public actors and have looked to
other methods of financing to fund their billion-dollar projects.176
Some of the more recently popular ways that teams have
sought to finance stadium projects are through tax-exempt bonds,
creating stadium authorities to fund the project (paid for by taxpay-
ers), and by increasing taxes on hotels and other amenities.  Tax-
exempt bonds are essentially promissory notes issued to the
170. 461 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
171. See id. at 93.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 543-45. R
175. See id. at 544-45.
176. See id. at 545; see also Matt Mosley, Jones Building a Legacy with $1.3 Billion
Cowboys Stadium, ESPN (Sept. 15, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/columns/
story?columnist=mosley_matt&page=hotread1/mosley (interviewing Jerry Jones,
owner of the Dallas Cowboys, about $1.3 billion Cowboys Stadium).
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franchise by the city for a specific purpose, free of federal income
tax on the interest for the city, and to be repaid by either the
franchise or constituent taxpayers.177  The Yankees “received a total
of $1.2 billion in tax-exempt bonds and $136 million in taxable
bonds,” with the estimated cost to New York City at $4 billion.178
While courts have not explicitly held that any private entity is a state
actor in the situation in which it or its facilities are funded by tax-
exempt municipal bonds, it must still be considered a factor in the
balancing test applied by the courts.  In Greco v. Orange Memorial
Hospital Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit conflated the nexus and symbiotic relationship tests in holding
that tax-exempt bond financing for a hospital does not make it a
state actor constitutionally liable for its decision to not perform
abortions because the abortions could not be viewed as an act of
the state.179  The type of funding is not a factor to be considered in
the entwinement (or nexus) test – as will be discussed in the next
Part – and was incorrectly incorporated, arguably leading to an in-
appropriate holding.
When the Arizona Cardinals built the University of Phoenix
stadium in 2006, the State created a stadium authority to receive
state financing to pay for and operate the stadium.180  While Ari-
177. See James L. Musselman, Recent Federal Income Tax Issues Regarding Profes-
sional and Amateur Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 195, 196-99 (2003) (explaining
sports teams’ use of tax-exempt bonds to build sports facilities).  This Article does
not discuss the merits of using tax-exempt bonds or any other type of financing for
professional sports stadium construction; it focuses solely on whether these pro-
vide sufficient benefit from the City to the franchise to create a public-private rela-
tionship.  For more discussion on the merits and tax consequences of tax-exempt
bond financing, see Gregory W. Fox, Note, Public Finance and the West Side Stadium:
The Future of Stadium Subsidies in New York, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 477 (2005) (studying
failed construction of West Side Stadium in New York); Laurie C. Frey, Note, How
the Smallest Market in Professional Sports Had the Easiest Financial Journey: The Renova-
tion of Lambeau Field, 18 SPORTS LAW. J. 259 (2011) (studying use of public financ-
ing for Lambeau Field); Scott A. Jenson, Financing Professional Sports Facilities with
Federal Tax Subsidies: Is It Sound Tax Policy?, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 425 (2000) (con-
cluding that arguments supporting professional sports tax have failed).
178. See Mike Dodd, Baseball’s New Palaces: Yankee Stadium and Mets’ Citi Field,
USA TODAY, (Apr. 2, 2009, 10:39 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/
2009-04-02-baseball-palaces_N.htm (citing owner of Yankees for proposition that
city owns Yankee stadium).
179. See Greco v. Orange Mem’l Hosp. Corp., 513 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1975)
(finding hospital to be private actor even though hospital had been financed with
tax-exempt bonds).
180. See Paul Munsey & Corey Suppes, University of Phoenix Stadium,
BALLPARKS.COM, http://football.ballparks.com/NFL/ArizonaCardinals/newindex.
htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (noting contributions from Arizona Sports and
Tourism Authority and Glendale); About Us, AZ. SPORTS & TOURISM AUTH., http://
www.az-sta.com/about_us.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (stating responsibilities
and organization of Arizona Sports and Tourism Authority).
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zona was not directly funding the construction of the stadium or
providing the franchise with accessible financing, an intermediate
state-controlled agency providing funding should be seen by the
courts as analogous to government financing.  It may even be advis-
able for the court to consider the fact that the private actor is at-
tempting to escape exposure to constitutional scrutiny by going
through the stadium authority for its funding.
The Reliant Stadium complex in Houston, Texas was paid for
by a combination of tax-exempt bonds, stadium authority funding,
and through lobbying for Harris County (where Houston is lo-
cated) to increase certain taxes to provide for further funding.181
The Harris County-Houston Sports Authority is funded primarily by
taxes on hotel rooms and car rentals, which then go to support re-
payment of the financing for Reliant Stadium.182  Other teams, like
the Baltimore Ravens and Cincinnati Bengals, have similarly re-
ceived funding for their stadiums via sales and other tourist
taxes.183
The fact that teams no longer use standard government fund-
ing, like the favorable lease terms the Yankees received in Ludtke, to
finance their extravagant stadiums and complexes should not be
the single factor in precluding them from constitutional scrutiny as
government actors under the Burton symbiotic relationship test.
Even if the funding is less direct, the complex financial relation-
ships still provide the franchises with a significant benefit. Burton,
despite being limited by other decisions by the Supreme Court, still
applies and should still be applied to the Yankees’ and other situa-
tions.  The City still receives the benefit of having a professional
sports franchise and the Yankees are still receiving a benefit similar
to that in Ludtke, where they were found to be state actors.
1. Entwinement
Scholars argue that the entwinement test is more appropriate
for First Amendment concerns, because the symbiotic relationship
test was developed during Civil Rights cases in the 1960s and was
181. See FUNDING AGREEMENT BY AND AMONG HARRIS COUNTY-HOUSTON SPORTS
AUTHORITY AND HOUSTON LIVESTOCK SHOW AND RODEO, INC. 18-19, HARRIS CO.-
HOUS. SPORTS AUTHORITY, available at http://www.houstonsports.org/downloads/
1346707649.55788100_21c84c0e48/funding_agreement.pdf (last visited Dec. 1,
2012) (enumerating various sources of funding).
182. Mike Morris, Sports Authority at Risk of Debt Default, HOU. CHRONICLE, Apr.
20, 2011, at B1, available at http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/
Sports-Authority-in-Harris-Co-runs-risk-of-debt-1686079.php (explaining funding
of sports authority).
183. See Frey, supra note 177, at 266. R
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used to attach the Equal Protection clause to private race discrimi-
nation.184  While this Article argues that the symbiotic relationship
test would create a stronger argument for the Yankees as state ac-
tors because of the financial interdependence found in stadium fi-
nancing today, entwinement is an often-used measure to determine
whether a private party is a state actor.  The entwinement test, de-
rived from the decision in Brentwood, focuses more on the situations
in which a private entity is essentially acting as a public actor.185  In
Brentwood, the Court found that the athletic association that regu-
lated interscholastic sports in Tennessee was a government actor
subject to constitutional scrutiny because its actions and employees
were so entwined with that of the school systems it regulated that it
acted as though it were the school system itself.186  The crux of the
test examines the degree of management and control the govern-
ment has within the private entity.187  This test, also described as
the “close nexus” test, looks at many factors, including whether “the
organization is mostly comprised of state institutions,” whether state
officials are the primary decision-makers in the organization,
whether the private actor is state-funded, and whether it is doing a
job usually done by a state actor, like the athletic association.188  In
light of these factors, the Court found that the Tennessee Secon-
dary School Athletic Association was a state actor because it “in-
cludes most public schools located within the State, acts through
their representatives, draws its officers from them, is largely
funded by their dues and income received in their stead, and has
historically been seen to regulate in lieu of the State Board of Edu-
cation’s exercise of its own authority.”189
One scholar looks at the example of the Cleveland Indians to
demonstrate how the entwinement test may apply to professional
sports franchises.190  In that case, the team was owned in a 50-50
split between the City of Cleveland and private investors.191  Addi-
tionally, the City provided 50 police officers for every game to en-
184. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 538-39. R
185. See id. at 548.
186. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.
288, 295 (2001).
187. See id. at 297 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)).
188. See Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir.
2008) (citing Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 295-99) (explaining factors of “close nexus”
test).
189. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 290-91.
190. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 549. R
191. See id.
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force the fan-conduct policies developed by the team.192  It is not
an unusual occurrence for the city to provide police officers to help
control the crowds and provide a greater semblance of authority
than the security guards wearing yellow jackets.193  That scholar ar-
gues that because of the continuing relationship in which the City
provides police officers at the stadium, privately owned sports teams
should be considered state actors.194
However, case law disagrees with this scholar’s interpreta-
tion.195  In Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a motorcycle club
could not bring a constitutional claim against the Garlic Festival
Association because the Association was not a state actor under the
entwinement test.196  The court reached such a conclusion despite
the fact that the City of Gilroy had provided police officers for the
festival that was located in a city-owned public park.197  Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit recently held that the private group that runs the
State Fair of Texas was not a state actor even though the City of
Dallas owns the Fair Grounds and provides police officers to patrol
the fair.198  Simply because the Fair runs a private event on public
property with government officials (the Dallas police), it does not
mean that a person can bring a Constitutional claim for being
thwarted from handing out Bible tracts.199  A closer relationship is
required of the parties in order to meet the “close nexus” require-
ment, especially when the private actor must be considered to be
192. See id.
193. See DeSiato, supra note 157, at 411-12 (citing Complaint at 1, Campeau- R
Laurion v. Kelly (S.D.N.Y Apr. 15, 2009) (Case No. 09CV3790)).
194. See Wasserman, Fans, supra note 25, at 549. R
195. See generally Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 955 (9th
Cir. 2008); Rundus v. City of Dall., Texas, 634 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2011) (declining
to find private company that ran state fair to be state actor); Lansing v. City of
Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding that “Memphis in May”
festival was not state actor when Memphis police officers removed “street
preacher”); Forbes v. City of New York, No. 05 CV 7331(NRB), 2008 WL 3539936,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2008) (holding, in response to motion for summary judg-
ment, that police officers assisting Lincoln Center security did not create a suffi-
cient nexus to make Lincoln Center state actor). See also DeSiato, supra note 157, at R
421 (“[B]ecause most clubs tend to maintain exclusive title of their facility, have
nearly complete autonomy over the facility’s operations, free speech regulation,
and in-facility security during games, it appears as though few, if any, facilities
would be considered state actors under this test.”).
196. See Villegas, 541 F.3d at 954-55.
197. See id. at 955.
198. See Rundus, 634 F.3d at 314-15.
199. See id.
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acting as the state, or that they are working so closely together the
two parties cannot be separated from one another.200
2. The Yankees as State Actors
Proving that a professional sports franchise is a state actor is
generally the most difficult aspect of a potential plaintiff’s prima
facie case.  Zacharaidis would probably strike out on this aspect if
he were to claim the Yankees are a state actor under the entwine-
ment theory.  The presence of police officers at the games, absent
other evidence of state involvement like in Wickersham v. City of Co-
lumbia, does not create a sufficiently close nexus to permit a court
to find in the plaintiff’s favor on this issue.  However, the symbiotic
relationship test provides a more fruitful avenue of argument for
Zacharaidis in the hypothetical issue in this Article.  While the
Yankees no longer directly lease the stadium or the land on which it
is built from New York City (as was the case at the time of Ludtke),
their current interdependent financial relationship should lead to a
finding of the Yankees as state actors regardless.  It is hard to deny
the billions of dollars that cities sacrifice to bring teams and to help
finance their mammoth construction projects, or to deny the finan-
cial return the cities receive.  This is a symbiotic relationship that
should lead to a finding of a private-public entity and Constitu-
tional scrutiny for the team.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the Yankees decided to remove Anthony Zachariadis
from Yankee Stadium and to subsequently ban vuvuzelas from the
Stadium, it was unclear whether the Yankees had violated the First
Amendment rights of Zachariadis and their fans.  Vuvuzela noise is
not traditional First Amendment speech, but still could fall into ei-
ther “cheering speech” or expressive conduct, both of which are
Constitutionally protected.  Based on the symbiotic relationship
test, the Yankees’ implicit financial partnership with New York City
likely makes them a state actor.  Furthermore, Yankee Stadium is
likely considered a limited public forum (assuming of course that
200. It is the latter scenario in Wickersham v. City of Columbia, in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that “the city’s role was
far more than ‘mere acquiescence.’”  481 F.3d 591, 598 (8th Cir. 2007).  The city
played a critical role in planning and executing the air show at issue in this case,
and it “played an active role in enforcing the particular speech restrictions chal-
lenged in this action . . . as part of ‘the agreement that’s in place’ with [the private
entity at issue].”  Id.  This direct action to be taken by the police, and agreed upon
by the private company, led to the court’s finding of entwinement. Id.
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the Yankees are state actors), because it is open to fans for expres-
sion during games but closed at other times.  Therefore, the restric-
tions on vuvuzelas would have to be analyzed under intermediate
scrutiny.  The Yankees’ “governmental” interest in protecting fans’
enjoyment of the game, as in Barrett, or in restricting noise, as in
Rock Against Racism, cannot hold muster to the interest that fans
have to express themselves in such an environment.  Zachariadis
would likely be able to prove all of the elements of his prima facie
case against the Yankees for violating his First Amendment right to
blow the vuvuzela in jeer of the opposing Phillies.  Allowing a plain-
tiff like Zachariadis to have standing and to be able to establish the
basis of a case against a professional sports franchise could have a
significant and much-needed impact on the sporting world.  Fans
are in need of some kind of recourse against teams; especially con-
sidering the extravagant ticket and merchandising costs teams im-
pose.  Completely limiting fan speech is just too much.
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